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0. Introduction 
In this paper, I shall defend externalism about knowledge. The main argument draws on a larger 
body of work in which I’ve argued that we should be deontological externalists about justification 
(Littlejohn 2012, 2014). The view is deontological because it characterises justification in terms of 
conforming to norms that tell us what we should or shouldn’t believe. It is externalist because it 
tells us that these norms can have external application conditions. In particular, I think that the 
fundamental epistemic norm tells us that what we should or shouldn’t believe depends upon what 
we can or cannot know. The main focus of this paper is externalism about knowledge rather than 
justification. Still, these debates are connected. These debates have been shaped by assumptions 
about the normative insignificance of knowledge and of external conditions generally that we 
should reject.      
 What is externalism about knowledge? If it were the view that knowledge supervenes upon 
what’s ‘in the head’ or upon the thinker’s non-factive mental states, we wouldn’t have much to 
discuss. Given the factivity of knowledge and some mild anti-sceptical assumptions, it should be 
clear that thinkers can differ in what they know without any interesting internal differences 
between them. Following Conee, I think we should think of the debate between internalists and 
externalists about knowledge quite differently:  
Externalist accounts of knowledge are those that reach farther 
into the external world than is needed to provide for Gettier 
prevention and truth. Some externalist accounts of knowledge 
replace the justification condition with something external, or 
count something external as justification (2004: 79).      
This is how I’ll understand the nature of the disagreement between internalists and externalists 
about knowledge. Let’s assume that externalism about knowledge is true iff knowledge doesn’t 
require justification or it requires justification but justification doesn’t supervene upon our internal 
states.             
 It’s possible to have propositional knowledge without justification in the sense that Agnes 
might know something even if she doesn’t justifiably believe it (Kornblith 1999; Littlejohn 2018; 
Sylvan 2018). For a creature’s responses to be justified, they have to be the kind of creature that 
can have responsibilities, duties, and obligations. I don’t think that owls, spiders, or squirrels have 
duties or responsibilities (e.g., a duty to refrain from entering your home, the responsibility to care 
for the young). If one comes in under a door or through a window, we don’t need to argue about 
whether its decision was justified. A creature’s response to their situation is only justified if their 
responses can call for a defence and be defended. When a creature cannot be held accountable for 
the way she responds to the situations she’s confronted by, the creature has no responsibilities that 
they might have failed to meet and so there’s no interesting sense in which their responses could 
be right, consistent with their obligations or duties, or justified.   
  Responses are justified only when the responding creature can be held accountable but 
have violated no norms. Norms don’t apply to tables or spiders, so even if they do something, 
their doings don’t have or lack justification. At some point, Agnes apparently decided to curl up 
on the couch to take a nap. If this is her flat and her couch and she’s an adult, her decision might 
have been justified. If she’s the upstairs neighbour and she’s snuck in through an open window, it 
might not have been justified. If she’s a cat or a dog, however, it doesn’t seem to matter which flat 
she lives in. It doesn’t seem that her decision could have been justified because she has no 
responsibilities.  
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If this is right, the view that says that propositional knowledge requires justification 
commits us to the view that only creatures that can be held responsible for their attitudes have 
propositional knowledge. This, however, seems like a mistake. If a creature can be rationally guided 
by a fact so that this fact could be this creature’s reason for f-ing, it seems that we can say that 
this creature knows that this fact obtains. As noted elsewhere, a creature’s reason for f-ing can be 
that p only if this creature knows that p (Hyman 2015; Unger 1975). Knowing that Agnes’s reason 
for heading to the kitchen was that the pie is finished tells us that she knows something about a 
pie, but it doesn’t tell you whether she’s the baker or a dog.  
The debate is settled. (The externalists win again!) Readers will hopefully read on. I’ll offer 
a second argument for externalism about knowledge, one that will hopefully shed light on the 
nature of the connection between knowledge and justification and expose the mistaken 
assumptions about these notions that shape the debate between internalists and externalists about 
knowledge.  
If it’s possible for non-human animals to have knowledge without having justified beliefs, 
this opens up an interesting theoretical possibility that hasn’t been sufficiently explored. Think 
about consequentialist theories of right action. Proper consequentialists think that the good is prior 
to the right. To fully flesh out the details of their view, they’ll need to identify something that has 
a kind of non-moral value that plays the role of right-making stuff. Truth doesn’t have a normative 
dimension or component, but many epistemologists think that it has a kind of normative upshot 
(e.g., that a belief’s being false gives us a reason not to hold, makes it the case that we shouldn’t 
hold it, etc.). It’s the kind of thing that could potentially be prior to epistemic rightness and so the 
kind of thing that might play a right-making role in our epistemological theories. Knowledge, by 
contrast, was widely assumed to have a normative dimension or component. Knowledge or 
relations to knowledge couldn’t play the right-making role in our epistemological theories if 
knowledge involved justification because then it would have rightness built in. It couldn’t be prior 
to the right if rightness were an aspect of it. But what if knowledge doesn’t have a normative 
dimension or aspect? What if it’s just a relation between an animal and a fact that obtains when 
that fact can rationally guide the animal’s responses, say? If knowledge didn’t have a normative 
aspect, it would be the kind of thing that would be at least eligible for playing a role in our theory 
of epistemic right-making. This, to my mind, is an exciting theoretical possibility that we should 
explore. If I’m right, knowledge is to justification what being optimific is to right action on the 
utilitarian theory.       
  
1. On the aim of belief 
According to the veritist, belief aims at nothing but the truth (Joyce 1998; Wedgwood 2002; Whiting 
2012). The gnostic disagrees. The gnostic thinks that belief aims at knowledge (Gibbons 2013; 
Littlejohn 2013; Sutton 2005; Williamson 2000). How should we decide between these two views?  
We might start by replacing this metaphorical talk of aims. We might, for example, replace 
this talk of aims with talk of norms. The disagreement between the veritist and the gnostic can be 
seen as a disagreement about whether the fundamental norm of belief tells us that we shouldn’t 
believe falsehoods (NO FALSEHOODS) or that it tells us that we shouldn’t believe what we don’t 
know (NO IGNORANCE).1 We also might replace this talk of aims with talk of functions.  Think 
about what beliefs are supposed to do. Let’s say that a belief is non-defective iff it can do what it’s 
supposed to do and defective otherwise. We can think of this disagreement between the veritist 
and the gnostic as a disagreement about belief’s function and about the difference between 
defective and non-defective belief.   
 
1 For defences of the veritist approach to norms, see Wedgwood (2002) and Whiting (2012). For 
defences of the gnostic approach, see Gibbons (2013), Littlejohn (2013), Sutton (2005), and 
Williamson (2000). 
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My preference would be to start with the functions. The norms can then be seen as telling 
us that we shouldn’t form or hold beliefs that are defective, that cannot do what beliefs are 
supposed to do. I’ll assume that the veritist wouldn’t want to concede that the gnostic has a better 
account of the difference between defective and non-defective belief and that the gnostic wouldn’t 
want to concede that the function of belief is properly described by the veritist’s theory. 
I’ve argued that if we want to understand belief’s functional role, we should think about 
the ways in which belief provides a basis for the various doxastic, affective, and practical responses 
that our beliefs rationalise. While many epistemologists think that a belief’s normative properties 
will be determined by what the belief is based on, we should also recognise that that the belief’s 
normative properties also depend upon whether it can provide an adequate basis for downstream 
responses (Littlejohn 2012). Think about closure principles. If you shouldn’t believe p’s obvious 
consequences, that’s a sign that you shouldn’t believe p. In having a justification to believe p, this 
positive standing should radiate outwards towards the things that you know follow from p. We 
can expand upon this. Suppose p is something that you reasonably hope isn’t so (e.g., a certain 
someone wins re-election, you have a virus, etc.). Suppose that you shouldn’t be upset that p. Given 
that p is the kind of thing that reasonable people would find upsetting, this is a sign that you 
shouldn’t believe p. If you should believe p, perhaps you should be upset that p. Maybe it’s being 
proper to be upset that p is a matter both of believing what you ought to believe about p and 
feeling what you ought to feel about p. Our beliefs (the attitude, not the object) provide a basis 
(the belief’s object, not the attitude) by providing us with propositionally specified entries to 
various forms of reasoning in which we treat the belief’s object as if it’s a reason. When you believe 
what you ought to believe, this removes one of the way that the downstream responses that belief 
rationalises could be unjustified or improper. Belief’s reason-providing role should help us figure 
out the difference between defective and non-defective belief. The defective beliefs don’t provide 
us with reasons. The non-defective beliefs provide us with reasons.    
 The veritist might think that this way of framing the issue shows the strength of their 
position. They might think that this view about reasons and function supports their view that true 
beliefs are non-defective. Think about the familiar idea that the value of true belief can be explained 
in terms of its practical benefits, the benefits of guiding us to Larissa or, more likely, the kitchen. 
Even if we think that it’s better to be guided by knowledge than mere true belief, say, when our 
action plans are complex (Gibbons 2001; Williamson 2000), they might insist that true belief is 
good enough for action. A true belief will, so long as it persists, guide us to where we want to go. 
If they’re good enough for this role, isn’t that enough to show that true beliefs are non-defective? 
 There are a number of problems with this argument. Arguably, these considerations about 
practical benefits don’t support the inference from false to defective belief because empirically 
adequate beliefs might also be fit for this practical purpose (Kvanvig 2003) and because false 
representations might nevertheless provide us with the map we need (Nolfi forthcoming).   
 The problem that worries me most is that we don’t need beliefs or the agent’s reasons to 
move the agent to act. The pragmatic approach isn’t helpful for thinking about the difference 
between defective and non-defective belief because it picks out a functional role (i.e., that of 
combining with our desires, wants, intentions to guide behaviour) that isn’t unique to belief. 
Credences that aren’t beliefs also play this role, so beliefs turn out to be dispensable on this picture. 
If you’re sufficiently averse to rain, even if you think that it won’t rain, you might take an umbrella 
just in case.        
 Thinking about the different functional roles of belief and credence can help us better 
understand belief’s functional role. In turn, it shows that we shouldn’t test competing theories of 
non-defective belief by thinking about states of mind that are good enough for the purpose of 
moving us towards some desired goal. What we should consider are functional roles that are 
distinctive of belief, roles that beliefs can play and credences cannot.  Recall Adler’s observation 
about reactive attitudes:  
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[O]ur reactive attitudes normally do not admit of epistemic 
qualification. There are all manner of differences between, say, 
mild and strong resentment … But there are no attitudes 
corresponding to a compromise between a negative reactive 
attitude toward someone (e.g., disgust, revulsion) and a weak 
epistemic position (e.g., I am slightly more confident than not 
that . . .) to judge whether the claims of that attitude are met. 
Mild resentment is never resentment caused by what one 
judges to be a serious offense directed toward oneself 
tempered by one’s degree of uncertainty (2002: 217). 
You can’t be upset with your landlord if you suspect that he might increase the rent again if you’re 
just as confident that he won’t. Increasing your confidence to being more confident than not 
doesn’t change things. Being highly confident on the basis of purely statistical evidence also doesn’t 
change things.  To be upset that your landlord has decided to increase your rent again, you have 
to be convinced that this has happened. To be upset with your landlord for raising the rent, you 
have to believe that he did that. Believing this is being convinced of it and it is when you’re 
convinced that you’re able to be upset for the reason that your rent is being increased again. Belief’s 
job isn’t just to move your bodily mass from point to point but to provide you with propositionally 
specified reasons that can constitute the basis of your decision, constitute your reason for being 
upset, and convince you that you need to do something about this situation. 
 Suppose belief’s distinctive function is to provide us with propositionally specified reasons 
that can figure in our reasoning and thereby potentially constitute one of our reasons for feeling, 
believing, or acting as we do. We can say that a belief is defective if it couldn’t contribute a reason 
to reasoning that could be our reason f-ing and non-defective otherwise. Which account gives us 
a better account of when a belief can play this role, veritism or gnosticism?  
 When can an individual’s belief (the object, not the state) constitute her reason for f-ing.2 
The veritist and gnostic can agree that A’s reason for f-ing can only be that p if A believes p and 
can agree that it can be that p only if p. The belief and truth conditions are common ground. The 
differences between these views are these. The veritist thinks that beliefs provide reasons iff they’re 
true, so the truth of a belief is enough and knowledge is not needed. The gnostic thinks that they 
provide reasons iff they constitute knowledge, so the differences between mere true belief and 
knowledge mark the difference between those beliefs that provide reasons and those that cannot.3 
 
2 Note that this reason is sometimes described as ‘the agent’s reason’ or a ‘personal reason’, which 
is sometimes identified with motivating reasons and thus would be a type of explanatory reason. 
While all motivating reasons are explanatory reasons, the converse isn’t so. Agnes isn’t very good 
at distinguishing Amy’s car from the neighbour’s car even though they are a different make, model, 
year, and colour. I might say that Agnes believes that Amy just pulled up outside the flat because 
the neighbour just pulled up outside the flat. In saying that this is why Agnes believes what she 
does, I’m offering an explanatory reason but it doesn’t identify Agnes’s reason. One reason why 
this couldn’t be Agnes’s reason for believing this is that she doesn’t believe that it’s the neighbour 
that just parked outside the flat. At the very least, if Agnes’s reason for f-ing was that p, Agnes 
believed p. This is because Agnes’s reason is a personal reason, something that Agnes took to merit 
or warrant the response in question and such things couldn’t be things that Agnes didn’t take to 
be true.     
3 Why should we focus on motivating reasons and not explanatory reasons? Because explanatory 
reasons needn’t be the objects of belief. Explanatory reasons will include such things, but it will 
also include beliefs and credences (or facts about them) and environmental conditions that the 
agent might be completely ignorant of (e.g., if you were a BIV, one (explanatory) reason why you’d 
believe you had hands would be that the vat operator has arranged things so that you’d be fooled 
into believing this). 
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When viewed from this perspective, it seems to me that the gnostic view is clearly preferable. 
When A’s reason for f-ing is that p, the fact that p explains A’s f-ing and so a consequence of A’s 
f-ing for the reason that p is that A f’d because p. This, in turn, requires that the connection 
between A’s f-ing and the fact that p is not wholly accidental or coincidental, a fact that’s sufficient 
to refute veritism. There’s nothing that true belief brings to the table that ensures that the 
connection between belief and fact is anything more than accident or coincidence. 
 Agnes wanted to cheat on her maths exam, so she brought her phone with her and used a 
maths app that ominously promised to give students the answers they deserved. She was shocked 
when she learned later that she managed to get but one answer right out of 100. It turns out that 
the answers were generated at random, so there was no guarantee that they’d get things right and 
no guarantee that they’d get things wrong. The teacher didn’t do her the favour of identifying 
which answer was correct, so Agnes is now as she was before, completely ignorant as to the 
answers to the questions on the exam. She believed that the answers were correct as she entered 
them and in 1 out of 100 cases her belief was true, but in none of these cases do I think we’d want 
to cite a mathematical fact as the explanans in explaining why she answered as she did. Contrast 
this with the case where Agnes finds a working calculator and develops a grasp of mathematical 
concepts and we might say that (assuming that she knows that the sum was 36) that the answer 
was even because it was divisible by 2. 
 If the ability to be guided by the facts that we seem to have in mind when we believe or 
when we’re convinced is something that we place any value in, it seems that knowledge has a value 
that’s not contained in true belief that seems to be connected to a distinctive function that belief 
and belief alone can play. And I think that cases like the above suggest that when the kinds of 
accidental connection betwixt belief and fact prevent it from constituting knowledge are all and 
only those that prevent the fact from constituting one of the agent’s reasons. Even when we expect 
to find defences of veritism, we sometimes accidentally find better defences of gnosticism. When 
Lynch, for example, tries to convince us that we value true belief and do so for reasons beyond 
those that have to do with guiding our actions, he rightly directs our attention to the fact that 
there’s something that’s missing from life in the experience machine in spite of all the pleasant 
experiences it forces upon us:  
We don’t want to live in the vat, even though doing so would make 
no difference to what we experience or believe. This suggests that 
we have a basic preference for truth … We can put this by saying 
that I want my beliefs and reality to be a certain way—I want my 
beliefs to track reality, to “accord with how the world actually is”—
which is to say I want them to be true (2005: 18). 
Focus on this last idea. If you want beliefs that track reality, you want true beliefs. This desire for 
having beliefs that track reality is not satisfied just by having true beliefs, however. Having the truth 
is not just a matter of having true beliefs. You cannot have the truth or track reality in Nozick’s 
experience machine, but we can surely have true beliefs whilst trapped in this machine, whilst cut 
off from reality, and whilst completely and systematically disconnected from the world outside the 
mind. 
 Some readers undoubtedly think that there’s room for something in between veritism and 
gnosticism. It’s one thing to say that an app that spits out numbers at random cannot put Agnes 
in touch with the facts or that we cannot track reality whilst trapped in Nozick’s experience 
machine and quite another to say that we need knowledge to close the gap. It’s at just this point 
people with tastes for complicated views like to trot out fake barn cases or cases of so-called 
environmental luck. They’re supposed to show that we can have the kind of contact reality that’s 
lacking from the cases above even if we’re not in a position to know. I don’t find these cases 
persuasive. 
 Here’s one diagnosis of what’s going on in such cases. When you see, say, a barn under 
good viewing conditions and it has that familiar look, the building has a look that’s not distinctive 
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of barns. Non-barns will have the same look and so will trigger the same classificatory dispositions 
as a real barn. Getting it right under conditions where there are easily encountered ringers will 
happen pretty much at random much in the way that Agnes’s app delivered the right answer to 
maths questions pretty much at random. In neither case do we have a process that classifies things 
correctly on the basis of the characteristics that trigger the classificatory dispositions, so I don’t 
see any real reason to think that the correctness of the classification of the barn as a barn shows 
that the subject is in touch with reality in the sense that matters to us.4 Yes, they see a barn. No, 
they don’t see that the building is a barn. We’re interested in contact with facts (i.e., that something 
is a barn, not a fake), not objects (barns, fakes, owls, etc.), and I suspect that confusions about the 
objects of perception and knowledge is largely responsible for the muddle that people get into 
when they think that the beliefs we form in environmental luck cases ‘track reality’ in spite of 
failing to be knowledge. Remind yourself that given your dispositions and the distribution of 
ringers in your environment that you’ll classify both barns and non-barns as barns at random and 
it’s hard to say that you are attuned to the presence of the property being a barn. 
 If belief’s function is to provide us with reasons that can serve as our reasons for feeling 
things, believing things, and doing things and reasons are the facts that we normally take them to 
be, there’s a case for thinking that the distinction between knowledge and ignorance corresponds 
to the distinction between defective and non-defective belief. If the norms that govern belief tell 
us that what we should believe or should not believe also corresponds to the difference between 
defective and non-defective belief, we can see why knowledge is the fundamental norm of belief. 
For these reasons, veritism doesn’t give us a plausible account of the function or norm of belief. 
  
2. On justification   
Let’s suppose that knowledge is the norm of belief. What does this tell us about justification? I 
think it tells us that justified beliefs have to be knowledge. This follows if we think that 
justifications function to identify responses that don’t violate the norms that govern these 
responses:  
CONFORMITY: Your belief about p is justified iff (and because) 
it doesn’t violate any epistemic norms. 
This idea is close to one that you’d find in, say, Gardner's (2007) work on the distinction between 
justification and excuse so I’m surprised when I hear that some people are puzzled by this 
proposal. When suspected of having violated a law, say, we can try to show that there was no 
violation (deny the offence) or we can show that there was sufficient reason to violate the norm 
in question (so that it was wrong but not wrong all things considered). Either defence, if successful, 
should show that the agent’s action was justified. Failing that, we might try to remove responsibility 
in some other way (e.g., by offering an excuse or an exemption) but what’s essential to a 
justification is that it establishes that the agent shouldn’t have done things differently and norms 
determine when we need to do things differently. 
Transposed to the case of belief, the idea is that there are some norms that we shouldn’t 
violate. If you’ve violated none of them, there’s nothing that could threaten justificatory status. If 
you’ve violated one of them and there’s no overriding reason that would justify doing so, you lack 
justification. That’s it. That’s the theory. 
 I know that some people think that there must be something more to justification than 
this. They might think that if, say, we form beliefs irresponsibly or against the evidence we couldn’t 
end up with a justified belief. The thing to say in response is not that such things couldn’t matter 
to justification, but to remember that such things do matter to justification if they’re built into the 
norms. If you thought that the only norms that governed belief had to do with truth or accuracy, 
this would be a pressing problem for you as you’d have to say that justification required something 
more or something different to norm conformity, but this isn’t my problem because my norms tell 
 
4 For further discussion, see (Littlejohn 2014a). 
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us that anything that matters to knowledge matters to justification. If you think that we cannot 
justifiably believe something by believing against the evidence, my account explains this in terms 
of a violation of NO IGNORANCE. This kind of objection to CONFORMITY reveals bad background 
assumptions about the identity of the norms that govern belief, not some insight into the nature 
of justification (Littlejohn 2013).  
 Most epistemologists agree that there can be false, justified beliefs, so they reject this:  
INFALLIBILISM: if you justifiably believe p, p. 
Since INFALLIBILISM is an obvious consequence of NO IGNORANCE and CONFORMITY, they need 
to reject one or both of these. The epistemologists who reject INFALLIBILISM aren’t as clear as I’d 
wish they’d be on whether they reject all truth-requiring norms or reject the idea that norms matter 
to justification, but it seems that their theoretical options would be these. First, they might say that 
whilst it’s bad in some way to believe what we don’t know, it’s not quite right that we shouldn’t 
form these (bad) beliefs (Kelp 2016; Simion 2019). (They can thus remain neutral on conformity 
and so allow that all justified beliefs conform to epistemic norms, but insist that no norm is violated 
when we believe falsehoods. All that happens is that we form a bad belief, fail to fulfil an aim or 
goal, etc.) Second, they might say that while NO IGNORANCE might be true, it tells us what we 
objectively shouldn’t believe. The theory of justification, they’ll insist, is concerned with subjective 
normativity only (Huemer 2001). Third, they might say that justification doesn’t require meeting 
the conformity conditions on doxastic norms. We can justifiably believe what we shouldn’t believe 
(Bird 2007; Ichikawa 2014; Reynolds 2013). What unifies this group is this idea some or all of the 
objective conditions that have to obtain for someone to know couldn’t be necessary for 
justification. They think that anyone interested in genuinely normative questions would only be 
interested in some non-factive notion of justification.   
 I want to push back against this idea that truth isn’t needed for justification. The factive 
conception of justification we arrive at when we combine NO IGNORANCE with CONFORMITY 
speaks to important normative issues. My argument starts with this simple idea.5 We should be 
guided by our beliefs. This seems like a platitude. Let’s unpack it. If we believe something, we 
should be guided by our beliefs. The belief’s content should figure in reasoning. I don’t think that 
this is true because we ought to treat the contents of our beliefs as a premise in reasoning, but 
because we ought to be able to treat the contents of our beliefs as a premise in reasoning provided 
that we believe what we ought to believe. What could the point of a theory of justification be if it’s 
not a theory of when it’s appropriate to form or have premise-providing attitudes and when it’s 
not proper to form or retain them? 
 We can say that there’s a kind of wide-scope norm that we’re all under some normative 
pressure to conform to. We ought to see to it that we either rely on our beliefs in reasoning or 
remove these beliefs from our set of premise-providing attitudes. Let’s focus on a special case, the 
case in which you believe that you ought to f. We can try to capture the content of this platitude 
about beliefs as follows:  
GUIDANCE: You ought to see to it that you don’t both believe 
that you ought to f and respond in an alternative way.6 
 
5 This builds on the argument from Littlejohn (2012) in which I argued that we needed an 
externalist view of the justification of belief to understand how categorical requirements can apply 
to all of us and to draw the line between justification and excuse in the right place. For arguments 
that we shouldn’t think that external conditions matter to justification, see (Boult 2017; Madison 
2017). For arguments, that they can that draws on the legal literature, see (Greco forthcoming; 
Littlejohn 2009).    
6 To simplify things, I’ll assume that you will f when you treat I ought to f as a reason in your 
reasoning.   
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The belief that you ought to head left, for example, is one that either you ought to abandon or 
ought to follow. If you try to head to the right whilst believing that you ought to go left, you violate 
GUIDANCE. In general, people seem to agree that you’re not supposed to do that.  
Suppose that CONFORMITY is correct and you justifiably f iff you permissibly f. Notice 
that GUIDANCE has this surprising implication. If you wonder whether you ought to f, you know 
that you’ll be in one of the following situations: you ought to f, you ought not f, or you are 
permitted to f and permitted not to f. Now, suppose that you’re in a situation in which f-ing is 
prohibited. Could you also be in a situation in which you justifiably believe that you ought to f? 
No, not if GUIDANCE is correct. If such a situation existed, you could justifiably believe that you 
ought to f even though you’d be required to respond in some alternative way, but then GUIDANCE 
would fail. If guidance is correct, so is this:  
NEAR NORMATIVE INFALLIBILISM: If you justifiably believe that 
you ought to f, you may f. 
How could this be true?  
 I’ve argued that INFALLIBILISM provides the best explanation of NEAR NORMATIVE 
INFALLIBILISM (Littlejohn 2012; 2014b). The cases now known as ‘morally loaded’ cases 
(Williamson 2019) provide a clear rationale externalism about justification and for thinking that 
the externalist conception of justification plays a central and important normative role. We can see 
this by examining views that uphold GUIDANCE but insist upon some non-factive notion of 
justification. Such views have to treat normative beliefs as a strange exception to the general rule 
that a justified belief might be false. As I shall argue below, such views are both theoretically 
strange and fail to vindicate important observations about the distinction between justification and 
excuse and about the normative irrelevance of normative uncertainty or misleading normative 
evidence. We need INFALLIBILISM to understand why we should be guided by our justified beliefs.    
 Not everyone agrees that guidance is true, but let’s focus on those views that try to 
accommodate GUIDANCE in some form or other. If I might speak loosely and crudely, if you reject 
INFALLIBILISM but accept GUIDANCE (and so accept NEAR NORMATIVE INFALLIBILISM), you need 
to explain why some normative beliefs cannot be justified if false given that your view predicts 
that so many of our beliefs might be justified but mistaken. One idea is that the difference has to 
do with the kind of evidence we have for normative beliefs. According to Smithies (2015) and 
Titelbaum (2015), we have maximally strong and undefeated epistemic support for believing 
certain apriori truths about certain normative matters. In other words, such truths are shiny. They’re 
given the same treatment as, say, logical truths in standard Bayesian accounts of rationality. 
According to a different way of thinking about these things, the exception is better understood by 
thinking about the kinds of truths we’re talking about. The normative truths are normative, so they 
have to be the kinds of things that can guide a rational agent (Fox 2019; Gibbons 2009; Kiesewetter 
2017; Lord 2018; Oliveira 2018). They couldn’t do this if, say, it could be possible for it to be true 
that Agnes ought to f when her evidence provided strong support for thinking that she ought not 
f or if she were the ‘same on the inside’ as someone required not to f.7 Rather than say that the 
normative truth shines so brightly that no rational thinker could miss it or be mistaken about it, 
we could say that the rational thinker’s epistemic position with respect to the normative 
proposition helps to determine its truth-value. The normative requirements might be malleable, 
determined by the epistemic situation of the thinker in question. It might be that Agnes ought to 
f because her evidence provides sufficiently strong support for the proposition that she ought to 
f. To make this concrete, we might imagine situations in which Agnes has either very strong 
evidence for thinking that death can be bad for sentient beings by virtue of being a deprivation or 
has very strong evidence for thinking that only sentient beings who can think of themselves as 
 
7 For responses to these arguments from guidance, see (Hughes 2018; Lasonen-Aarnio 2019; 
Littlejohn 2012; 2019). 
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creatures that exist over time can be harmed by being killed. Under one scenario, she might be 
rationally required to believe that hedonism is true and that it is false under the other scenario. 
Given some assumptions about cows, the shifty view might predict that Agnes would have 
different obligations in these two scenarios concerning cows (e.g., being required to give greater 
weight to their deaths in one scenario as opposed to the other). This would be quite different to 
how the INFALLIBILIST thinks about such cases. Suppose that if hedonism were true and cows 
were sentient beings who didn’t have preferences about their futures. Under this scenario, it might 
be impossible for Agnes to justifiably slaughter cows as a way to make money, in which case she 
couldn’t justifiably believe that she ought to slaughter cows as a way to make money regardless of 
which evidence she happened to have.  
 Two kinds of case cause trouble for views that combine guidance with some non-factive 
view of justification. The first concerns factual ignorance and mistake. The second concerns 
normative ignorance and mistake.    
 
2.1 The justification-excuse distinction 
Let’s begin with cases of defence of other and imperfect defence. In the good case, the agent 
knows that a potential victim is faced by a threat, knows that the potential victim cannot flee or 
escape the situation, and so knows that force must be used if the potential victim is to be saved 
from the threat (e.g., a mugger, a loan shark, etc.). In the bad case, the agent mistakenly believes 
that this potential victim is faced by a threat and knows that she cannot escape or flee the situation 
if this person is indeed a threat. She should, given the commitments of some non-factive account 
of justification, justifiably believe that force would be needed to defend the potential victim. We 
hold fixed the conditions that the non-factive view deems to be necessary and sufficient for 
justification when it comes to all the non-normative beliefs and the relevant parties all share the 
general normative knowledge about necessity, proportionality, and the like. We can zero in on 
mistaken factual beliefs or factual ignorance to think through the case. 
 Here’s a naïve picture of rights. We each have the right against others that they don’t harm 
or kill us when we pose no threat to anyone else and when our being harmed or killed isn’t an 
unavoidable side-effect of a course of action that the agent might pursue for the greater good. 
Rights come with correlative duties. If you have the right not to be killed or badly injured, the 
people you interact with have the duty not to kill or harm you. On this picture, your rights 
supervene upon factors that are distinct from (and not contained in) the factors that determine 
whether the people you interact with can (given the resources of any non-factive view of 
justification) justifiably believe that you pose an imminent threat to some potential victim that they 
know can only be protected by harming or killing you. On this picture, the duties that an agent has 
won’t supervene upon the factors that determine whether her beliefs are justified. Thus, whilst 
defenders of such accounts could claim that we each have justification to believe things generally 
about the rights we have, the duties that they entail, the conditions under which they can be 
infringed, and so on, the justificatory status of non-normative connecting beliefs are a potential 
problem for anyone who wants to defend GUIDANCE. In particular cases, the combination of apriori 
normative knowledge and mistaken but (putatively) justified non-normative connecting beliefs can 
lead the agent to (putatively) justifiably judge that they ought to do something that, inter alia, 
violates the rights of another person.  
 It seems that if there can be false but justified beliefs about the nature of the situation (e.g., 
about whether someone is a genuine threat), GUIDANCE will conflict with the naïve picture of 
rights from above. After all, GUIDANCE seems to commit us to this conditional:  
JUST FORCE: If an agent knows what kinds of situations require 
her to use lethal force to defend someone from an aggressor 
and justifiably believes that these conditions obtain, she can 
justifiably use this force. 
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If we combine JUST FORCE with some factive view of justification, we can uphold both GUIDANCE 
and the idea that mistaken beliefs can excuse but not justify killing or harming in defence of self 
or other.  If, however, we combine just force with standard non-factive views of justification, we 
have to say that mistaken beliefs can justify the use of lethal force or the imposition of harm, not 
just excuse it. This draws the distinction between justification and excuse in the wrong place. This 
is clear when we think about informational asymmetries. In learning that an innocent person was 
harmed, say, it seems that we don’t just learn that something bad came to pass. We learn that 
reparations need to be made. In seeing an agent use force against an apparent aggressor, outsiders 
who know whether the apparent aggressor is a threat or not know how they ought to intervene if 
they were to get involved (e.g., to assist the apparent aggressor if innocent). These facts are difficult 
or impossible to explain if we say that the apparent aggressor’s rights against others depends upon 
the kinds of non-factive epistemic support they might have for their beliefs.8  
  
2.2 Justification and Normative Uncertainty 
If there can be false, justified beliefs, there shouldn’t be any principled reason why we couldn’t 
have false, justified beliefs about normative matters (e.g., about principles or norms, about values, 
etc.). As we’ve seen, though, GUIDANCE places limits on the kinds of things that we might have 
false but justified beliefs about. If, like me, you’re sceptical of the suggestion that every rational 
thinker has undefeated justification provided by excellent evidence to believe certain basic 
normative truths and think that rational thinkers might have evidence that supports the relevant 
basic normative propositions to differing degrees, you might think that the two most interesting 
approaches to GUIDANCE will either appeal to a shifty view or INFALLIBILISM. I shall argue that if 
we accept GUIDANCE, we’ll need INFALLIBILISM to understand the relevance of normative 
uncertainty to permissibility and blame.         
 Let’s consider some examples:  
MONKS: Some monks in the grips of views about the 
permissibility of certain kinds of sex acts more conservative 
than yours give in to temptation even though they believe they 
ought to abstain (Littlejohn 2014b).    
Our monks might meet the conditions imposed by non-factive theories of justification for the 
belief that they ought to abstain and take steps to see to it that others abstain. Under such 
conditions, non-factive theories of justification will presumably say that they ought to believe that 
they ought to abstain. This, when combined with guidance, tells us that they ought to abstain. I 
disagree, of course. I don’t think that their beliefs and the epistemic support for them generates 
any normative pressure towards abstaining. Moreover, it seems quite plausible that if someone 
knowingly does what they shouldn’t do (failing duress), they should be blameworthy for what 
they’ve done. But we should refuse to blame the monks since their actions don’t manifest de re 
unresponsiveness. Combining GUIDANCE with non-factive theories of justification leaves us in the 
uncomfortable position that we either need to blame people for doing things that we know don’t 
fail to show sufficient respect for morality’s concerns or leads to a kind of scepticism about 
responsibility in which even known wrongdoing needn’t be blameworthy.   
 Srinivasan (2020) offers a similar example that’s helpful to consider: 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: Radha is a woman who lives in rural 
India. Her husband, Krishnan, regularly beats her. After the 
beatings, Krishnan often expresses regret for having had to 
beat her, but explains that it was Radha’s fault for being 
insufficiently obedient or caring. Radha finds these beatings 
 
8 It is controversial whether we should classify imperfect defence of self or other as excused or 
justified. For an opposing view, see Bolinger (Forthcoming) and Zimmerman (2008). This 
argument is developed further in Littlejohn (2012). 
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humiliating and guilt-inducting; she believes she has only 
herself to blame, and that she deserves to be beaten for her bad 
behaviour. After all, her parents, elders, and friends agree that 
if she is beaten it must be her fault … Moreover, Radha has 
thoroughly reflected on the issue and concluded that, given the 
natural social roles of men and women, women deserve to be 
beaten by their husbands when they misbehave (forthcoming: 
8). 
Srinivasan says that Radha’s belief that she deserves to be beaten is not justified even though it 
seems that we can draw on familiar epistemological theories to support the opposing verdict. She 
sees this as a challenge to internalist theories of justification, but I think it poses a more interesting 
challenge to any non-factive theory of justification. Should we classify Radha’s beliefs as justified?  
 Johnson King disagrees with Srinivasan’s verdict:  
I don’t think that this is such a terrible verdict. For an 
internalist, saying that someone’s belief is justified in no way 
constitutes an endorsement of their belief-forming 
circumstances. So, saying that Radha’s belief is justified is not 
an approval of patriarchal ideology — no more than saying that 
the brain-in-a-vat’s belief is justified is an approval of the 
practice of putting brains in vats. Rather, for the internalist, 
saying that someone’s belief is justified is a way of giving her 
credit for doing the best she can, epistemically speaking, under 
whatever circumstances she is in (ms: 12).  
Johnson King is right that we sometimes do the best we can and end up with false normative 
beliefs. If internalists were happy to say that these beliefs are the result of Radha doing the best 
she could or that they fit well with her other attitudes, it’s hard to take issue with that, but I don’t 
think that these evaluations track particularly important normative properties. Suppose that we 
say that Radha’s beliefs were justified and we said that justification was a really important 
normative property because of its connection to rightness, permissibility, and blame. If we said 
this and we accepted GUIDANCE, we wouldn’t just say that Radha’s beliefs were justified. We would 
have to say that the actions and attitudes rationalised by such beliefs were also justified. This, I 
think, helps us see why the non-factive notions of justification are not normatively central.    
Consider the belief that the beatings are deserved and justified and that a woman’s duty is 
to submit to them without complaint. If this belief is justified, GUIDANCE tells us that it should 
justify the beliefs, actions, and emotions that this belief rationalises. These beliefs would be 
supported by her (putatively) justified belief about the abuse she’s receiving: that she’s being 
treated properly and fairly, that it would be wrong to protest or to use force to protect herself, 
that she should teach her sons and daughters to assume these roles, that she, too, should use the 
force the tradition allows to ensure that her children are brought up to continue this pattern of 
domestic abuse. The emotions that would make sense given these (putatively) justified beliefs 
might include feelings of guilt for protesting or shame for doing the things that ‘merit’ the beating 
but would not include the feelings of anger, indignation, or resentment. When it comes to action, 
it seems that treating Radha’s belief as justified and accepting GUIDANCE would mean that she 
wouldn’t be justified in protesting or using force to defend herself. She would, however, be 
justified in, say, helping her sister’s husband control her sister’s life using violence and raising her 
children to believe, feel, and act in ways that reflect this ideology. 
If GUIDANCE holds, it is hard to see how we can fully disapprove of the bad ideology 
insofar as we agree that it would be right for those who have internalised it to continue to believe, 
feel, and act in accordance with it. If, however, we try to resist this and say that the actions and 
emotions supported by Radha’s beliefs are not justified, we could deny guidance, but then we deny 
that the operative notion of justification that attaches to her beliefs does interesting normative 
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work. We’d deny that justification, so understood, rationalises the downstream responses that 
belief is supposed to support.  
It’s also worth thinking about the connection between blame and justification. If Radha’s 
beliefs can be justified in the scenario described above, I suppose the same should hold true for 
Krishnan. If Krishnan punishes Radha for protesting and believes that this is the right thing to 
do, should we say that his beliefs are justified? I think it’s helpful to consider this passage from 
Rosen’s discussion of moral ignorance and exculpation:  
Ignorance is culpable only if it derives from culpable 
recklessness or negligence in the management of one’s 
opinion. Take any case of action done from ignorance and let 
it be stipulated that the agent has been utterly scrupulous in 
policing his own opinion: he has been as careful and as 
inquisitive and as reflective as a person in his circumstances 
should be, and yet he has failed to grasp some crucial fact. I 
claim that if you bear this stipulation clearly in mind, you will 
be persuaded in every case that the agent’s ignorance is not his 
fault (2004: 302).    
Rosen seems to think that having justified normative attitudes might require nothing more than 
meeting certain procedural epistemic duties (e.g., considering salient arguments, follow the 
reasoning to its conclusion, etc.), but let’s focus on this idea that Krishnan would be blameless if 
his belief that he ought to do what he’s doing was justified. Rosen might be right that this 
conditional is quite plausible, but I also think it’s clear that Krishnan is culpable for his behaviour. 
His beliefs, like his actions, reveal a commitment to a set of values that are incompatible with 
those that morality cares about. He’s culpable for what he’s done because what he does manifests 
de re unresponsiveness (Arpaly 2002). If so, it seems equally fair to say that he’s culpable for his 
belief that he ought to act this way. The belief also manifests de re unresponsiveness. He knows 
why he abuses Radha and he knows of her suffering, but this doesn’t move him to revise his belief 
that this is what he should do. His belief is thus not in line with the things that could make it right 
to form beliefs in this field of propositions. The lesson that I’d take from this is that the 
justification of our actions and attitudes couldn’t just be a matter of meeting some procedural 
epistemic obligations (Alvarez and Littlejohn 2017).  
 Let me briefly recap. If knowledge is the norm of belief and justification requires 
conforming to norms, our justified beliefs are only justified because they’re knowledge. To resist 
this view, epistemologists might deny that knowledge is normative for belief (e.g., by saying that 
it’s a goal, an aim, a good thing, or a desirable state) or deny that justification requires conforming 
to norms, but I think the problems with these views emerge if we think about the rational relations 
between belief and the responses that belief are supposed to rationalise. If our justified beliefs are 
the beliefs that ought to guide us, our choice of a theory of justification is going to inform our 
broader views about the line between justified action and excusable wrongdoing or about the 
normative significance of normative uncertainty. Combining GUIDANCE with standard non-factive 
accounts of justification forces us to revise our views about rights and revise our views about the 
normative irrelevance of normative uncertainty to permissibility and blame in undesirable ways. 
Rejecting GUIDANCE, on the other hand, leads to lots of awkward questions. If our settled view is 
that we can be required to conform to norms or blamed for violating norms that we justifiably 
believe don’t exist or don’t apply to us in the situations we’re in, we’re externalists of a pretty 
radical kind. And if we think that this externalism has implications only for the downstream 
responses rationalised by belief but has no implications for the requirements that apply to belief 
itself, we’re left with this odd and difficult to motivate position that the reasons against feeling or 
acting in line with our beliefs are often not any kind of reason at all not to form these beliefs. I 
don’t see how this could be a stable or well-motivated position. I think that we need a radical form 
of externalism about justification to understand how certain norms apply to us at all and determine 
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what we ought to do, but this might require rejecting any view that’s designed to allow for false, 
justified beliefs.     
 
3. On externalism about knowledge 
I’ve argued for two claims. The first is that knowledge is the norm of belief. What we ought to 
believe is determined by what we can know. The second is that justification requires conforming 
to norms like the knowledge norm. What we can justifiably believe depends upon what we can 
believe without violating the norms that govern belief. When these views are combined, we’re left 
with the view that justified beliefs are justified because they constitute knowledge.  
 If this view is right, what does this tell us about the internalism-externalism debate? Recall 
Conee’s characterisation of the debate. He characterises this as a debate about whether knowing p 
requires meeting the justification condition where the subject’s internal states determine whether 
that condition is met. Given the moderate anti-sceptical assumption that internally indiscernible 
pairs of thinkers can know different things, if we say that our beliefs are justified because they are 
knowledge, we’re committing ourselves to an externalist view of knowledge. If the normative 
standard that determines what we ought to believe determines what we have justification to believe 
and tells us that what we ought to believe depends upon what we can know, knowledge is prior to 
justification in the same way that the good is prior to the right in consequentialist views.  
 In framing the debate in the way that he has, Conee seems to have assumed that 
justification might be part of what ‘turns’ our beliefs into knowledge and overlooked the possibility 
that it’s knowledge that bestows upon them their justificatory standing. Once we see that what 
we’re responsible for as believers is seeing to it that we don’t believe what we don’t know, we can 
see why these debates about the justification condition rested on a mistake.  
This mistake had a number of sources. Part of what prevented people from seeing that 
knowledge plays an important normative role is neglect of cases of animal knowledge where it 
seems that attributions of propositional knowledge seem apt even though normative evaluations 
of attitudes seem out of place. Part of what prevented people from seeing that knowledge plays 
an important normative role is the mistaken idea that belief is a state that aims at the truth and 
(crucially) nothing but the truth. And, of course, part of what prevented people from considering 
the possibility that knowledge is necessary for justified belief is a failure to take seriously arguments 
for externalism that weren’t part of, say, the reliabilist project of trying to distinguish between 
beliefs that constitute knowledge and beliefs that fail to do so for Gettier-type reasons. I don’t 
think that we’ll find in these arguments convincing arguments for externalism about justification.  
My argument for externalism about justification didn’t start from the idea that we need 
something that plays a justification role that helps to eliminate some kind of bad epistemic luck. 
My argument for externalism started with this idea that certain norms apply to us and determine 
how we ought to respond even when we’re uncertain about whether they apply to us in the 
situation we’re in (e.g., as is the case with the norms that determine when defence of self and other 
is permissible) or uncertain about whether the norms pick out normatively important features of 
the world (e.g., as was the case in MONKS or in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE). If we ought to conform to 
such norms and we ought to be guided by our beliefs, we have to see to it that we don’t believe 
falsehoods that would lead us to violate these norms. The only views that vindicate this are views 
that accommodate INFALLIBILISM.        
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